Cognitive synonymy: a dead parrot?

Abstract

AbstractSentences$$\varphi$$φand$$\psi$$ψarecognitive synonymsfor one when they play the same role in one’s cognitive life. The notion is pervasive (Sect. 1), but elusive: it is bound to be hyperintensional (Sect. 2), but excessive fine-graining would trivialize it and there are reasons for some coarse-graining (Sect. 2.1). Conceptual limitations stand in the way of a natural algebra (Sect. 2.2), and it should be sensitive to subject matters (Sect. 2.3). A cognitively adequate individuation of content may be intransitive (Sect. 3) due to ‘dead parrot’ series: sequences of sentences$$\varphi _1, \ldots , \varphi _n$$φ1,…,φnwhere adjacent$$\varphi _i$$φiand$$\varphi _{i+1}$$φi+1are cognitive synonyms while$$\varphi _1$$φ1and$$\varphi _n$$φnare not (Sect. 3.1). Finding an intransitive account is hard: Fregean equipollence won’t do (Sect. 3.2) and a result by Leitgeb shows that it wouldn’t satisfy a minimal compositionality principle (Sect. 3.3).Sed contra, there are reasons for transitivity, too (Sect. 3.4). In Sect. 4, we come up with a formal semantics capturing this jumble of desiderata, thereby showing that the notion is coherent. In Sect. 5, we re-assess the desiderata in its light.