Private and public economic incentives for the control of animal diseases: the case of anthrax in livestock.

Abstract

This study examined the roles of the public and private sectors as economic components of anthrax control with direct reference to the 2005 anthrax outbreak in livestock in North Dakota. Anthrax is an endemic disease in North Dakota, which often causes disease outbreaks in livestock, leading to economic losses to the livestock industry. The economic incentives and interests behind public and private control of an anthrax outbreak are investigated. Anthrax management is most effective with the participation of public and private firms. As anthrax is an infectious disease, its control also brings positive economic externalities, which are not accounted for in a producer's decision to protect animals. Therefore, public programs designed to control the disease must be implemented. The government can change producer response to anthrax by setting up policies and incentives that encourage their participation. However, these interventions must encourage compliance and not discourage producers from actively taking part in anthrax management. Producers have economy-based interests and personal reasons for controlling anthrax in their farms. The main reason behind government intervention is to provide assurance to the public who consume livestock products. Another reason is to assist producers and veterinarians, and to achieve biosecurity and biosafety objectives. The contribution of each animal healthcare partner in making anthrax management a success in North Dakota is discussed.